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IN1RODUCTION 
DECENTRALIZATION REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA 
-A FRAMEWORK OF CHOICE' 
Central authority and local autonomy are always at odds with each other. This holds true for the 
relationship between central control and the decentralization reforms in China over the past sevi;nteen years. 
' 
Decentralization-a process where decisionmaking powers are transferred downward from some centcl point-has 
indeed been one of the major components of the post-Mao economic reform. Why would a Leclmst central 
1 
' ! 
government be willing to share its monopoly power of economic decision-making with localities and individual I 
I 
enterprises? Many studies of decentralization tend to view decentralization solely as a triumph of local interests, 
I 
hut in so doing they ignore the perspective of the central government. 
In this paper, I intend to provide an analytical framework for addressing this question from th
1
e perspective 
of the Center, where top policy makers reside.2 This framework focuses on strategies of state control in economic ! 
' reforms. The significance of this focus is magnified in the study of reforming communist and post-communist 
' 
I 
regimes, because exploration of how elites attempt to maintain control over the economy and how econ~mic policies : 
enter into the power struggle is fundamental to the understanding of the post-Mao decentralization ,reform. 
i 
Despite the decentralization reform, the Chinese central government still tries to hold as much political I 
authority and as many major economic resources as possible. Under a framework of choice, I will hlvestigate the 
I 
' "piece-meal" nature of the decentralization program and the problems that developed along the tortuous path of i 
I I 
China's decentralization reform. I will show that in face of the economic stagnation and succession struggle left I 
by Mao Zedong, the ideological closeness and similar experience during the Cultural Revolution bro~ght together 
two political groups, who pursued different degrees of decentralization reform, in defiance of Mao'~ hand-picked 
successor. More important, I will analyze the political reasons for the central leaders to pursue the decentralization ; 
' 
reform, and examine what burdens the Center divests itself of via decentralization and what benefits it receives in: 
return. I argue that governments choose a policy to solicit political support, to increase revenue, or to pursue risk- ' 
' I 
I 
' I 
~ --· i 
averse strategy, i.e. to rid themselves of heavy economic burdens or political costs, for instance, in the face of 1 
economic crisis. 
In the following, I will first provide critical comments on the concept of "state capacity" and any analytical I 
framework that is built upon this concept. I will adopt the concept of 'broadened individual ratialality" as the 
I 
I 
central conceptual tool for analysis in this paper. Then, I will lay out the socio-economic background of the initial 
stage of post-Mao reforms, before analyzing the· different strategic choices for reform. Last but not the least, I will 
: I 
examine the chosen decentralization project, i.e. what to decentraliz.e, to what extent to decentraliz.e, and what not ] 
to decentraliz.e in the post-Mao -reforms. This analysis of decentralization will best illustrate the benefit-cost matrix I 
' ' I 
desired by the central leaders, hence the rationales by which specific decentralization design was chosen. 
I 
I 
I STATE CAPACITY OR STRATEGIC CHOICE: A Critique of the State Capacitv Argument I 1 
Some studies in comparative politics as well as Chinese politics start with an analytical n~tion of state I 
capacity. State capacity is often vaguely defined in terms of the capability of a variety of state functions that control 
I ' ' 
or influence the economy and/or society. In this sense, the weakening state capacity is used as a cor concept in ; 
' ' 
explaining China's decentralization. Although insightful, state capacity cannot help us to explorel central-local ! 
relationship in general or to analyze the origins of China's decentralization reforms in particular. F"~t of all, state ' 
' 
' ' 
capacity is endogenous, but not explanatory, in understanding central-local relationship. The concept may be an 1 
index of political outcome, but is not an independent variable in the study of post-Mao political-economic reforms. 
We may want to study the capacity of a "state" and find out what lead to a strong or weak "state.": In the study' 
I 
' 
of the changing relationship between the central and local entities, state capacity might be something to 
1
be explained. 
Studies in Between Power and Plenty, edited by Peter Katzenstein, may explain problems concerning the "state 
capacity," but they are not a study of the "state capacity" per se. "Central to the concerns of [Katzenstein's] volume 
is the analysis of actors in state and society,"' that is, anyone who can effectively affect the foreign economic policy 
I 
outcome. Second, the concept of "state" is vague, especially in the studies of developing countries like China, not• 
to mention doubts about the existence of an independent and functioning civil society in China. If we want to set 
2 
up a state-capacity framework to deal with the changing relationship between the central and local governments, 
various questions arise about the definition of the "state." Does the "state' include local (governmental) powers? 
Does it include dan-wei (work units) in China? The analytical framework that Peter Hall sets UJ! in his book 
I 
Governing the Economy: the Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France is not state-centric! Rather, he 
I 
takes 'an institutional approach to state-society relations,' an approach which emphasizes the relatio~al characters 
of institutions that 'bind the components of the state together and structure its relations with socie'!. "4 We are 
facing a paradox: in one case we encounter a vague state that cannot capture the essence of political authority, in 
the other case we have a clear definition of the state as the regulator of society in a state-society dich~tomy, which 
might nonetheless be misleading to study the communist system with no effective civil society. Thir~, the concept , 
of "state capacity" is vague. What constitutes a 'state capacity?" Only financial power? Need we include or 
I 
' 
exclude the military power? What about such intangible elements as personal influence or loyalty? Th~ contributors 
I 
to Stuart Schram's volume The Scope of State Power in China discuss the growth of the financial resources of the 
'state," and then pose serious doubts about whether the Chinese ever have had a notion of the economy as a specific 
domain inside or outside of the state apparatus. 5 The rapidly emerging literature on political economy emphasizes 
I 
the interaction between the political domain and the economic domain of public life. "State capacity" I can never be 
I 
' defined only by economic strength. One the other hand, a budget deficit does not necessarily indicate the weakness I 
' 
of state power. Politics in one sense means the power to use money in other people's pockets. State capacity might 
be appropriate in some discussions if it refers to the central government's capacity to levy taxes. 6 
Furthermore, "state capacity" is not measurable from a single perspective. Has the introduction of the' 
I I 
household responsibility system in agriculture reduced or enhanced 'state capacity" in China? Som~ may find the I 
' 
decline of the 'state capacity' upon the introduction of household responsibility system. But Vivienn.e Shue points 
out that agricultural reforms in post-Mao China have actually destroyed the old 'honeycomb" self-protection system 1 
I 
in Chinese rural areas. This destruction in tum has made the agricultural population more vulnerable to central 
manipulation, hence enhancing the power of control or influence of the Center. 7 Again, how do we measure the 
power of central or local authorities increased or decreased by the household registration system? Even if we try 
3 
to put aside the definitional and operational problems of the state-capacity framework, the capacities of a "state" 
to initiate and implement a program tend to depend as much on the informal institutional rules and norms as of the . 
formal state regulations. For instance, the effectiveness of taxation relies on the institutional arrangement of the , 
I I 
tax system; just as the ability of Chinese central government's extraction of national income depends on its : 
negotiation power with each province. Finally, the concept of "state capacity" cannot indicate the redistribution of I 
power within the state appara~. For instance, how can "state capacity" show the relative ascension of the State 
Economic Commission at the expense of the relative decline of the Ministry of Finance after the 1991 plenum of 
the Party Committee? The biggest challenge to the Chinese authority actually comes from within, and the intra-state 
conflict is both inherent and formidable. Unfortunately, the concept of state capacity cannot capture the essence ' 
of the politics of redistribution of power between the central and local governments. 
' 
Ifwe assume that the Chinese state's capacity is largely determined by how well it is able to direct various ~ 
I 
state agencies to work for the goals set by the Center, to centralize resources to the point sufficient enough to sustain j 
I 
! 
these goals, and to make and enforce rules among inferiors to ensure adequate compliance, then why don't we make • 
I , 
it unambiguous and conspicuous and call it central government "capacity" or administrative "capacity?" Even so, : 
I 
we still need to understand that: "the state institutions and political skills that can produce such a creatjve 'political- ' 
economy' balance do not appear automatically when needed as part of some adjustment policy imperative."' More 
important in the study of decentralization, it is not some vague and unmeasurable state capacity, but th~ technocratic 
' 
and bureaucratic ability to formulate and implement policies that facilitate the economic logic of reform, and the , 
I 
political ability and freedom to buffer the costs of this process while allowing it to take place. Duel to the fact of 
' ' 
the party control in contemporary China, there has not been much going on between the "state" :Jnd the "civil: 
I 
society." What we are looking at is the political game within the party-state apparatus, and in that game the II 
strategic choices of individual policymakers are the primary focus. J 
This paper views decentralization reforms as a game of redistributing power that is dominated by the central 
leaders, and adopts "broadened individual rationality," instead of state capacity, as its central conceptual tool.9 It 
4 
' assumes that policymakers are strategic players and have relative autonomy to pursue their own in1"rests. 10 To 
understand post-Mao economic reforms, this paper regards the personal power, promotion, orprosperi~ as the basis i 
for policy choices of the policymaking participants. These choices are of course constrained by ~r reflect the I 
i 
ideological commitment and institutional instruments available. By analyzing the policy basis, this paper intends 
I 
to build up a framework of choice to study the economic reforms in post-Mao China. I 
I 
Before examining the political reasons for the choice of decentralization, I will briefly lay out the socio- I 
I 
economic background of the initial stage of post-Mao reforms and explore how economic reform is perceived by ; 
. ' I 
different policymakers in the next two sections. 
'IHE LEGACY OF MAOISM 
The econ()mic stagnation that persisted in China through the later part of the 1970s has been well 
documented. By 1977, the per cspita growth rate was only 0.5 percent per annum; from 103 yuan in_ 1957 it grew 
only to 113 yuan in 1977 .11 Shortages of food products and local rationing of consumption reinforced one another 
' 
through the 1970s. It is estimated that by the mid-1970s over one-third of urban grain consumptiol csme from 
I 
imports. In short, "[i]n the face of the government's stated objective of achieving self-sufficibncy in food 
i 
production, the Cultural Revolution [1967-1976] agricultural policy must be judged a failure. "12 
During 1957-79, the growth rate in industrial production ran as high as 10 percent per annum. This high 
growth rate, backed by steadily escalating state investment, led to a decrease in productivity of c~pital, which 1 
I 
dropped by 40 percent in national industries. Labor productivity also dropped by 5 percent during 1965-75. ; 
' 
Aggregate factory productivity, which had increased by 48 percent during 1952-1965, fell by 11 percent in the I 
following decsde. 13 This growth was further undermined by problems of inefficiency and poor c~ordination in I 
I 
"production and circulation" management. Half of the state-owned enterprises ran at a loss. In the urban area, : 
wages for state workers were virtually frozen from 1963 to 1977. 
5 
'· 
Excessive investment in the heavy industry and insufficient attention to the development of supporting 
industries and infrastructure led to mismatches between supply and demand. The economy was imbalanced to the : 
extent that, during 1949-1978, the agricultural output increased by 2.4 times, while the industrial ou~ut as a whole I 
increased by 38.2 times, and the heavy industry by 90.6 times and the light industry by 19.8 times. 'I Agriculture I 
only received a 10 percent share of state investment. 15 A reform was badly needed to solve the accumulation of ( 
I I 
these extended problems. But who was going to lead the reform, and what could be the solutions?, 
After the death of the Party Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai, and the military leader Zhu De i 
. , I 
within nine months in 1976, a fierce succession struggle ensued within the top elite. A quasi-military coup a month 
\ ' 
after Mao's death ousted the "Gang of Four" radicals headed by Mao's widow, but did not stop th~ elite power j 
I I 
struggle. It only started a new round of succession struggle. The moderate leftists and those preJiously called I 
' I 
' "capitalist roaders" joined in a temporary coalition against the "Gang of Four" followers, but worked intensely on; 
building their own power bases respectively. 
! 
' Many officials had been promoted as a result of factional fights during the tumultuous years of the Cultural I 
Revolution. Having experienced the absurdity of the communist system in such an extreme form ~ the Cultural I 
: I 
Revolution, nobody trusted those ideologically radical upstarts. The political legitimacy of the communist leadership 
faced a serious challenge in the eyes of the Chinese people. Since power and policy are fused in Leninist-type 
regimes, political legitimacy is often dependent on successful economic policies. Politicians in such systems have 
an irresistible tendency to pursue economic reforms to order to solicit political support for the legitimacy of their ! 
I 
leadership. Toward the end of the 1970s, Chinese leaders formulated different development policies1forpost-Mao: , I 
economic reform. 
In the next section, I will explore how economic reform is perceived by different policymakers in face of' 
the political and economic problems left by Mao. This helps us to understand their motivations and preferences with 
respect to a decentralization reform. Contending perceptions of economic reform reflect different interests among 
i 
6 
policymaking participants as well as policy-targeted populations. Similar perceptions, on the other hana, would join · 
different groups into a political coalition. 
I 
THREE CHOICES I 
While the legacy of Maoism, i.e. economic crisis and succession struggle, demanded a chan~e in national ! 
' I I 
policies, the institutional structure and norms of politics in China might constrain any drastic wholesale policy i 
I I 
I 
reformation. Although most Chinese leaders believed that a certain structural reform would provide, incentives to I 
I 
cadres, workers and peasants so as to make the economy run more efficiently, they were divided by appealing to i 
different groups of supporters, supporters for their economic policies, and thus for their leadership. Some leaders 
' I 
encouraged "part of the population [to] get rich first" (yibufen ren xlan faqilai), and they appJ.ied to local 
I 
govermnents, individnal enterprises, and peasant households. Therefore, they pursued a decent~ approach in I 
I 
the structural reform. Other leaders stressed more the notion of economic equilibrium and balanced development, I 
and they appealed to economic planners, bureaucrats, and technocrats who theoretically helped maintain these : 
equilibrium and balance. Therefore, they took a less decentralized approach in the structural reform. Still other 
I 
leaders wanted to uphold Maoism, and played the old political game by appealing to heavy industri~ interests and i 
other vested interests formed during the Cultural Revolution. At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the i 
' ' 
1980s, Chinese elites were facing three policy options. They were moderate leftist reform, minimum 
decentralization reform, and optimum decentralization reform. 
Moderate Leftist Approach: After the downfall of the "Gang of Four," Hna Guofeng, the successor , 
I : 
appointed by Mao in early 1976, represented a leader who would implement moderate leftist policies,- Under Hua j 
Guofeng's leadership, nothing Mao said or wrote was ever repudiated. Politically, Hna Guofeng pursued the "two I 
whatevers" policy,16 stressing the need for loyalty to Mao's memory and past decisions, limiting the "rectification I 
of the Party" to those directly linked to the "Gang of Four" radicals, and obstructing the reinstatement of the veteran : 
officials purged during the past two decades. This policy was intended to secure Hua Guofeng a smooth power 
transition and not to create any new political challenges. But Hna Guofeng also wanted some attractive programs, 
7 
I 
"to make up the losses caused by the Gang of Four. "17 So he tried hard to follow Mao's policies in the mid-1950s, 
when Mao was emphasizing economic development and the conciliatory management of non,-antagonistic 
relationships among the people. 
Immediately after taking the office of the party chairmanship, Hua Guofeng called for a new leap forward, 
I 
and his Ten Year Plan for National Development (1976-85) set the targets for 1985 calling for agricultural I 
I : 
production to increase 4 percent per year and industrial production to increase 10 percent per, year. 18 He j 
announced that under the plan 120 major industrial projects were to be completed as the initial stage in the ; 
' 
moderni7Ation drive. The list of projects included 10 steel mills, 9 nonferrous metal complexes, 8 cc?al mines, 10 i 
oil and gasfields, 30 power stations, 6 railways, 5 harbors, petrochemical plants, and a variety of nlanufacturing ; 
facilities for producing machinery and electric components. 19 These targets were criticized by HJ's opponents 
I 
I 
as unrealistic and reminded people of Mao's idealism that led China into the economic disaster during the Great I 
I 
I Leap Forward less that twenty years ago. 1 
I 
In his plan, Hua Guofeng only proposed some modest structural changes. In agriculture, whlle aiming for 
1 
I 
higher levels of col!ectiviz.ation, he allowed the limited revival of private plots and free markets. fu industry, he 
' ' ' suggested reestablishment of multi-provincial economic regions and permitted transformation of some industrial I 
' 
ministries into state corporations. However, the direction of these changes was ambiguous, and the central-local 
I 
I 
relationship was not a priority inHua's plan. Conceivably, the basic character of Chinese politics and the economy 
I 
would have remained unaltered, and there was not much new incentive generated. 
' 
In the past, the heavy industry had been the bulwark of Maoist policies. Ni before, Hua Guofeng's i 
I 
selection of projects continued to reflect a policy of emphasizing the heavy industry at the expens~ of the light 
industry, and a policy of import substitution. The most important difference between this plan and the ultra leftist ' 
' ' 
policies of the "Gang of Four" radicals was its sheer magnitude and emphasis on economic development. Its huge : 
' 
state investment in heavy industries might attract people in these heavy industries, for instance the Petroleum ' 
' ' 
8 
Gang,'" but it did not provide the whole country with much incentive. Simply stressing the n;,portance of 
economic growth, Hua Guofeng's development strategy did not appear to solve the problems of lack of incentives 
' 
and initiatives under the planned economy. Considering the economic situation and a whole variety of other 
I 
problems in the late 1970s, not many Chinese people found Hua Guofeng's development program ~!tractive. 
I 
I I 
Moreover, Hua Guofeng was a relative political neophyte at the center of power, who emerged with Mao's ! 
' ' 
' 
endorsement as a compromise candidate between the radicals and the liberals. In facing economic stagnation and I 
' 
political fragmentation, Hua Guofeng did not present the leadership that many people desired; neither did he provide : 
sufficient incentive to obtain widespread political support. The radical rhetoric continued for a while, and Hua ' 
! ' 
Guofeng's efforts to cloak himself in Mao's mantle raised doubts whether there would really be ah ideological • 
I i 
turnabout and economic take-off. When the Petroleum Gang was gone in 1980, Hua Guofeng's pli\n finally lost j 
one of its major supports. 
Minimum Decentralization Approach: As the chief spokesman for a policy that values the cen\ral planning, : 
Chen Yun, the master of China's planned economy and one of the Party's Vice Chairmen, proposed to make the · 
I ; 
market an important supplementary mechanism for the allocation of goods and services and the determination of ! 
prices. 21 Economically, they opposed the Maoist revolutionary approach to production. Chen Yun and his 
associates understood the devastating consequence of the radical mass mobilization approach and the frequent, thus 
destructive, intervention of the Party apparatus in the national economic operation. Politically, this group of policy 
I 
I 
makers challenged the ability of the moderate leftists to manage the national economy. They championed a 1 
' I 
decentralization of authority over economic policy making from the Party to the bureaucrats and prof!"'sionals, but I 
I I 
wanted to restrict the scope of the market to consumer goods or at most to some small ~ufactured I 
commodities."' According to them, central planning would continue to occupy the dominant positi~n in China's I 
economy. They usually defined socialism as requiring a "planned economy" and state ownership of the means of 
production. They emphasized preserving an equilibrium in the management of the Chinese economy: a balance 
between government revenues and expenditures, a balance between exports and imports, and a (contrived) balance 
9 
• 
between supply and demand for major commodities. 23 
' ' In terms of central-local relations, Chen Yun and his associates feared that a rapid relaxation of ' 
I ; 
administrative controls over the economy would create severe disequilibrium in all of the aforementioned three i 
' ' 
areas, as a result oflocal governments launching new investment projects at will, workers demanding ~gber wages ! 
\ I 
and better standards of living, and enterprises importing capital equipment and consumer goods from abroad I 
I 
recklessly. Leaders and officials of this second group advocated continued reliance on central planning. For them, 
not only planning, but central unitary planning, should lie at the heart of the Chinese economy. Whi\e some other ' 
Chinese elites believed that the scope of mandatory planning should be reduced, Chen Yun and his associates , 
I 
maintained that administrative guidance from the planning agencies must always control certain critical sectors of 1 
! I 
the economy. 24 For them, central allocation of resources had been the crucial mechanism of Chinese planned I 
I 
economy. In this way, the local governments would still be an implementing agency without real power to manage I 
local economies. 
While this approach repelled local governments and enterprises, Chen Yun and his followers 'Yere skeptical I 
' about both the growth of individual ownership in the Chinese economy and the experiments with the sale of stock 
1 
in state enterprises to individual workers and investors. They believed that economic liberalization ~ould nourish 
a growing gap between supply and demand, a deficit in the state budget, a shortage of foreign exchange, and most 
importantly, a lack of coordination between the Center and localities. The only alternative to centrai planning for 
them was the "anarchy" of the market, which was unacceptable. They wished to maintain fairly stringent , 
' ' 
administrative control over certain aspects of the economy, especially investment and foreign excha'nge, in order \ 
I I 
to preserve economic balance. 25 They cautioned against the inflation created by price reform, the decline of central I 
control over investment and the expenditure of foreign exchange, the emergence of inequality in the countryside, I 
I 
and the failure of grain production to meet state targets should mandatory planning be eliminated. Finally, this 
group of elites opposed any sign of political pluralization that would challenge the dominance of the Party in Chinese 
political life. 
10 
J 
! 
This approach attracted a handful of planning officials and central ministerial bureaucrats who were in 
charge of individual economic sectors. These officials and bureaucrats wanted delegation of power from the Party ' 
• I 
at each administrative level, and they were also willing to hand over responsibilities to lower ranks in the localities. ' 
I 
However, they, like their leaders, intended to concentrste most power at the central government. 
' Optimum Decentralization Approach: The paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was apparently. the leader of 
the group advocating this optimum decentralization approach, but the major policies under this approach were 
forcefully proposed by Premier Zhao Ziyang. In the first place, this group offered a looser and ~ore flexible 
definition of socialism so as to attack the dogmatic moderate leftists. As early as November 1979, Zhao Ziyang 
excluded the planned economy from the list of principles implied by a commitment to socialism., This group f 
believed that mandatory plans were only necessary in two cases: for products of mainstay enterprisd that were in 1
1 the national plan and affect the people's livelihood, and for products of which the deinand exceeds th."supply. This 
! 
idea was close to that of the minimum decentralizers', although the optimum decentralizers advocated a much l 
: 
I 
greater role for the market than two other groups. Zhao and his followers favored the development 'lf markets for , 
' ' 
almost all factors of production, including capital and labor, as well as for every type of raw material ~d industrial : 
machinery. 27 They also favored opening the Chinese market to imports from foreign countries and the products : 
I 
of foreign ventures in China, asserting that only by doing so could Chinese enterprises increase their ability to : 
compete in the international marketplace. Since 1979, Zhao Ziyang had encouraged the rapid expansic;in of the light 
industry, while Politburo member Yu Qiuli, the leader of the Petroleum Gang, sought increased inv.lstment in the 
' 
heavy industry. Optimum decentralizers gradually developed the ideal that the market could be paramount, and the , 
' ' 
I 
plan secondary in Chinese economy. 
Sharing with the second group a similar approach to politics and in an attempt to weaken the power base 
of the moderate leftists, the optimum decentralize rs advocated a restructuring of the Party to reduce its control over 
personnel appointments in non-Party organizations and minimize its interference in the day-to-day operations oflocal 
economies. However, they favored greater pluralization than the other two groups. They proposed expanding the 
11 
•• 
role of national and local legislatures, granting greater freedom to the press, and enlarging the authority of 
provincial and local governments to prevent the arbitrary exercise of political power by the central Party authorities. 
The leaders of this third group opened basic political questions, including the structure of the state and the role of : 
' I 
the Party, to more candid and probing examination. Zhao Ziyang's advisory groups even discussed the possibility 
I 
I 
of a real multi-party system. 28 I 
In terms of central-local relations, they believed that local governments, like enterprises, should take more : 
I 
responsibility for their revenue and expenditure. They encouraged local governments to spend their money more ! 
! 
efficiently according to their local specialties. Zhao Ziyang advocated greater reliance on market n\echanisms to i 
' ' I 
improve efficiency. In his view, the rigidity of central planning had prevented units from being se~itive to local I 
conditions and had prevented competition to increase productivity. 
. I 
There was also a sub-group within this group. This sub-group was comprised ofleaders and ,officials who 
I 
had risen from provincial and municipal positions. They were less ideologically driven than power driven. 29 Most ' 
i 
of them still had close connections with their local counterparts, and part of their power bases were still in their own , 
' ' 
' I 
localities. They urged decentralization reforms to maintain their local support and delivered some benefits from ' 
the Center to their local clients to show that they did not forget that they were friends. In this way, Deng Xiaoping I 
and Zhao Ziyang's decentralization was different from Mao Zedong's in 1957 and 1964. They not only demanded 
' 
freedom of decision from established bureaucracies, but their main concern was the freedom of deci~ion from the 
Party veterans and functionaires. Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang knew that for the implementation of their reform I 
' I 
strategies they depended more upon the free will of provincial and city leaders than upon the Party n\ies and Party \ 
secretaries. 
Although the minimum decentralizers preferred a protracted process of structural reform, with lengthy 1 
periods of readjustment during which the imbalances generated by reform can be repaired, and the optimum 
decentralizers, in contrast, suggested far more rapid structural change to remove quickly the inefficiencies and 
12 
1 " 
rigidities of the previous economic system, both groups agreed upon the need to relax central control over the 
economy. 30 In economic policies, both decentralizers were different from the moderate leftists, and they , 
I 
emphasi7.ed the need for structural changes in order to create incentives for economic development. As far as 1 
I I 
ideology and political experience during the Cultural Revolution are concerned, Deng Xiaoping Jd Chen Yun I 
I I 
groups shared more similarity with each other than with Hua Guofeng. Most of Deng and Chen's alisociates and I 
followers were purged during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, Hua Guofeng was considered as j incompetent ! 
- ! 
incumbent whom both Deng and Chen groups wanted to replace. It is therefore not difficult to see that the l 
, I 
decentralizers joined together in a political coalition, and latched on to decentralization in order to grope their way 
I 
across the river of political and economic crisis. 31 
I 
The three different reform strategies provided choices for the Center to make collectively. However, lack 
I 
of a unified understanding of China's economic problems and solutions and lack of a unified leadership made the i 
post-Mao reform to take the style of 'piece-meal' reform along the tortuous path of China's decentralization. The ! 
agricultural reform32 started sporadically, and the industrial and urban reform was delayed until 1984, eight years ' 
! 
after Mao's death. Other economic reforms since 1979 have always begun with limited pilot proj<;ets. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Economic development policies in the reform decade oscillated between Chen Yun's and Deng Xiaoping's i 
ideas. But whether minimum or optimum, the decentralization approach was chosen by Chinese eli_tes obviously 
I 
for political reasons. But, for what kind of political reasons? What were their political motivations? What kinds 
! 
of political benefits could decentralization bring to central authority? These are the questions to be ad~ressed in the 
next section. 
WHY DECENTRALIZATION? 
Along with the agricultural reform that started in the late 1970s, China's central leaders also launched a 
limited revenue-sharing reform. The revenue-sharing reform allowed local governments to retain a large share of 
taxes levied by themselves and to use this amount of revenue in their needs. 33 The central govpmment then 
I 
I 
13 
,. 
reallocated many enterprises formerly run by central ministries to local jurisdiction. 34 These reforms resulted in , 
an administrative decentralization of economic decision-making. The Center also delegated decision-making 
authority from the Party secretaries to administrators in the government and to the managers in th~ enterprises. I 
I . 
There are several different kinds of decentralization reforms that have been launched during the post-Mao era. But I 
I , 
before we examine these different reform programs, let us first address a broader question: Is decedtralization in i 
I 1. 
and of itself simply good? 
This question has attracted worldwide attention, in developing countries as well as in developed countries. 
Decentralization in developed countries generally refers to efforts to create alternatives to the growir!g strength of ; 
centralized government and to counteract bureaucratization. 35 Focused on urban areas, the p~ goals of i 
I I 
decentralization are believed to promote both more citizen participation in community decision-making and more j 
efficient and responsive urban service delivery." To most students of developing countries, decentralization is , 
more concerned with the transfer of planning, decision-making or management powers from the national government : 
to sub-national levels.37 Most of the discussions of governmental structure in a Third World context, however, 
: 
draw upon models and theories of decentralization that have .been generated from the experience and!values of the 
industrialized Western countries. There exist both strong advocates as well as vocal critics of decJntralization. 
Proponents of a decentralized structure commonly associate it with a wide range of positive economic, 
social, and political effects in both developed and developing societies." They argue that decentralif.ation makes 
' government more efficient, responsive, and stable. Economically, decentralization is said to improve !he efficiency 
with which demands forlocally provided services are expressed and public goods provided. Market niodels oflocal i 
t 
decision-making treat decentralization as a means of expanding the scope of consumer choice among public goods. 1 
Decentralization is also said to reduce costs, improve outputs and more effectively utilize human resources. In I 
I I 
i I 
countries where development must be achieved as a very condition to the nation's survival, many scholars regard ' 
decentralization as a necessary condition for national and local development. 39 Philip Mawhood, for example, 
' 
argues that centralization of formal authority is one organizational form which is wholly inappropriate for Third , 
I I 
I I 
M i 
l 
World governments if they seek to bring about social change and modernization. He believes that local authorities 
in most of the developing world are more apt to be stifled by too much central control and influence than fail ' 
' 
because of having too little of it. 40 
I I 
Politically, the redistribution of power downward is assumed by advocates to bring gove~ent closer to [ 
I 
the people and strengthen accountability, political recruitment and national integration. Decentralliation is also j 
credited with promoting liberty, equality, and welfare and providing a training ground for citizen participation and I 
political leadership, both local and national. Thus, decentralization has been elevated to the role of gilarding basic : 
human values. 
All these economic and political reasons might be well placed. And all the above arguments; explicitly or 
I 
implicitly, assume that the government desires to serve the people and nation whole-heartedly, i.e. without any I 
I 
interests of its own. Advocates of decentralization see a natural need or an 'administrative necessity• t~ decentralize \ 
because of the excessively heavy burden of work that the central government is carrying. They view delegation 
as an inevitable feature of modem society, for problems are complex and time and other resources are scarce. 
Accordingly, decentralization is an attempt to minimize the costs of making decisions. 
However, as Morris Fiorina argues, this line of reasoning is not accurate, neither has it shown that the 
I 
complexity of public problems has increased faster than the capacities of bureaucrats and official~ to deal with 
them. 41 But what we have seen is the increasing size of the contemporary governments. In the United States the 
' 
amateur legislators of the 19th century spent four to five months per year in Washington, D.C., accokpanied only I 
, I 
I I 
by a few clerks. Today's professional legislators spend full time on the job and are served by approxiriiately 25,000 I 
staff employees. Here, the complexity or necessity argument is unable to show whether the mode~ affairs have 
grown more complex than the capacities of the people who are handling them. 
During the reform decade in China, the average annual increase in the number of governme!'t cadres also 
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reached a record point of 330,000 per year, compared with an average increase of 110,000 per year jbefore 1980. : 
By the end of 1986, the total staff of government offices and org.:nizations was 7.34 million, 78.2 Pfrcent higher! 
' 
than 1979. Government administrative expenditures increased over the same period by 250 pe..Jent. 42 More 
I 
important, in any decentralization project, scholars find thatthe government has delegated selectively, but not across 
the board. They further find that these delegations have not necessarily solved the original problems lf complexity 
or inefficiency. 43 Finally, personnel quality usually is lower in local governments than in the central government. 
So, although modem affairs became more complex, they are handled by a huge bureaucratic army witli such modem 
technologies. as telephones, airplanes, copy machines, and computers. On the other hand, not all d~entralization 
has resulted in quality service, or simplified modem affairs. I 
I 
In the study of Third World policies, many scholars are critical of decentralization and ta1cb the position! 
! i 
that a strong centralized national government is necessary in countries characterized by limited! resources, a 1 
dependent economy, and political instability. In their view, decentralization may not lead to efficiency or growth, ' 
and it often appears parochial and separatist. It threatens the unity of the "general will" and reinforces narrow, ' 
' 
' ' sectional interests. 44 According to this argument, decentralization legitimizes forces antagonistic to the regime by · 
incorporating them into the state apparatus at the regional or local level. The result can be the creatio~ of dispersed i 
' ' power in the periphery without balancing it with a capacity to act at the Center. Some even warn that the , 
' ' ' proliferation of central administrative power to the local level can bring about a deterioration in the quality of 
' 
. I 
administration as larger numbers of officials with less education, narrower outlooks and limited experience are , 
: 
employed. 
Critics of decentralization are not limited to developing countries. In Britain, there have been warnings 
I 
against assuming that more centralization in local government is inevitably bad. L. Sharpe, for example, points out 
that improvement in efficiency and democracy has not automatically followed the reorganization oflocaJ government 
in more decentralized forms. 45 In the United States as well, some scholars have reacted strongly against what they 
see as the inefficiencies and diseconomies of political fragmentation within metropolitan areas." On a more micro- · 
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scale, the decentralization of power from the city to the neighborhood level has been opposed not only, as a betrayal 
of racial integration, but as an invitation to replace personnel systems in urban government based ~n merit with 
patronage systems. 47 
Indeed, we cannot be sure about whether decentralization in and of itself is good or not. But,governments 
I 
still decentralize; and more important to our study, decentralization has been a major part of the post-¥ao reforms. 
I 
' ' Still, the above discussion has not hit the core of the question of why Chinese leaders decentraliz.e their power of : 
economic decision-making. 
' I 
I 
In an attempt to address such why question, a third group of scholars contends that neither 'a centrali7.ed : 
' 
system nor a decentralized system work as their advocates believe. Both systems fail for veiy similar reasons. 48 I 
Robert H. Bates, among others, points out that people want and demand public services, but seek to evade the costs : 
of their provision. While central officials increasingly advocate the devolution of the supply and financing of public 
services to the local areas, decentralization fails because of the same problem of free-riding. Bates further posits, 
' 
"Behaving as individual decision makers, people will take into account solely the satisfaction which they alone derive : 
from the consumption of that good and not the satisfaction which their acquisition of the good would provide for : 
: 
others. Failing to take into account the effect of their choices on others, people will tend to underestimate the ' 
good's true value and will therefore make choices which lead to an undersupply of the good. "49 Even though there 
may well exist an equilibrium in situations involving public goods, such as economic regulations, by using a market-
like institution ofvoluntaristic and decentralized choice, this equilibrium will not be efficient. The principal reason , 
! I 
for this is that public goods generate "inappropriate" incentives. Evasion of the costs of the good and a failure to . 
supply it are thus expected results under this kind of decentralized institution."' While decentralization from a ; 
general and normative perspective may have pros and cons at the same time, both in developed and developing : 
countries, and in planned and free market economies, the third group of scholars suggests that it is necessaiy to look 
at some specific institutions or public choice processes in order to understand the political rationale for 
decentralization. Although they have not provided a quick and specific answer to our question, their studies have 
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pointed out the right direction of analyzing this issue. In the process of public choice, the Center plays a major 
' 
role, and the political elites and their specific interests are therefore the focus of analysis in our analytic framework. 
I 
I 
' ' I ' 
China scholars tty to understand decentrali:zation through defining the government interesls attached to I 
particular reform designs or programs. Groups that perceive the reforms as detrimental to their in~rests would I 
I 
exploit emerging economic and social problems to argue against decentrali:zation reforms. They ~ould stick to ' 
' I 
centrali:zation or force a return to it. Those leaders who foresee rewards from decentrali:zation exceeding costs i 
I 
' would initiate or pursue reform programs. In other words, individual leaders in power only make or support those 
I 
policies that are regarded to benefit their own interests. But what are their interests? There are at least three ways , 
: ' 
to identify motivations and interests of policymaking participants. 
First, one can define motivations and interests along an ideological spectrum. Scholars along this line : 
' 
assume that people, especially politicians, are ideology-driven. Reforms are motivated by ideologi~ or rejection 
of other ideologies. Politicians are more interested in seeing their dreams coming true. Mao Zedon~ pointed out , 
' 
that wherever there is a group of people, there must exist the left, the center, and the right. The pplicy adopted i 
I 
reflects the ideological position of policymakers. In some studies of Chinese politics, the oscillation of Chinese i 
I 
policies is explained either by a struggle between the moderates and the radicals" or by a struggle among the I 
conservatives, the reformers, and the radicals". But we are not sure whether ideology is the motiyation or just 
a label as Mao rightly put it. Against the oversimplification and static weakness of the ideology ar~ment, there 
is now a growing consensus that in China ideology does not matter, but is an ex post facto justification of any 
beneficial policies. 
' Second, one can define motivations and interests according to the positions and functions these people are ' 
' I 
holding." One argument asserts that Party officials, especially the older veterans of the revolution, worry that 
economic reforms will make their political skills obsolete, deemphasize their function, and therefore diminish their 
power. So the Communist Party dominated by the old veterans is often assumed to oppose politi.cal-economic 
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reforms.54 This Party-as-opposition argument treats the Party as mnch more monolithic than it actnally is. A 
second argument under this category looks at geographic location as opposed to bureaucratic specialization, such , 
' as regional, horizontal control by local governments versus sectoral, vertical control by central ministries in the I 
I I 
Soviet-type systems. Whereas the Sovietologist Jeny Hough sees Party and government officials wJo administer I 
the same city or province working together as a local alliance to obtain more resources for their arl, 55 A. Doak i 
, I 
Barnett finds that Chinese Communist Party and government officials who manage the same econonilc sector are ' 
• I • 
joined together in functional-bureaucratic systems. 56 While bureaucratic specialiZAtion attempts to achieve vertical 
control of sectoral economy, people outside the capital city want to get more autonomy by "dismantlin~" the central 
authority. Then the question is: what side does a local light industry official take? What makes him or her take 
either side? Tue location-versus-specialiZAtion argument does not address and cannot answer these' questions. 
A third approach is·to define motivations and interests by a combination of the previous two criteria: a 
coalition argument. Susan Shirk sees two coalitions impeding or supporting decentraliZAtion reforms. 51 At one 
end is the "communist coalition" of heavy industries, the inland provinces, and the central bureaucracies. At the ' 
other end stands the reform coalition; But if we examine closely, they are coalitions only at certain points of time : 
. ' 
and on certain issues. For instance, the central bureaucracies may side with the reform coalition in quest for the : 
I 
reform of separation of the Party and government. Tue inland provinces may support the reform coalition for more '1 
I 
radical "open door" policies. Some heavy industries may support the tax reforms. Tue fact is that different 
political, economic, or social groups support different reform programs. Shirk herself realiz.es that "[o]fficials 
concentrate on finding a higher-level patron to protect the interests of their unit and on bargaining with the upper-
level organizations rather than on building a united front to influence policy.""' In China, there is iln absence of 
stable horizontal coalitions. 
Each of the preceding arguments lends some insights to understanding the motivations and interests of 
policymaking participants in decentraliZAtion reforms. Different social and political groups come together to press 
for certain policies. But more important, leaders would also pursue a certain policy as their own choice to appeal 
19 
' . 
' 
to or to create a political coalition. So the essential question is: What kind of political benefits could , 
i 
decentralization bring to central authority? In order to grasp the issue in its entirety, we need to understand that : 
! 
benefit-cost matrices produced by the decentrali:ration programs provide different incentives which motiyate different 
I 
players. 
I 
' 
I 
From a choice theoretic perspective, I argue that governments choose a policy to solicit political support, 
to increase revenue, or to pursue risk-averse strategy, i.e. to rid themselves of heavy economic burde~ or political 
costs, for instance, in the face of economic crisis. Many top Chinese leaders can clearly foresee what kinds of 
benefits and costs a particular decentralization proposal would bring about, because they had played the . . 
. ' 
decentrali:ration game several times over a period of thirty years even before the post-Mao ref~rms. Since i 
I I 
I 
delegation oflegislative authority does not necessarily affect policy choice of the Center," the Chine5e elites seek : 
to use decentralization to shift the responsibility for the costs and benefits that public policies produce. Under ; 
central planning, the central government is not only responsible for making policies, but also ~onsible for , 
supplying production resources and selling products. Theoretically, the central government, in a centralized system, 
I 
has the entitlement to all taxes, but should finance local expenditure."' In face of a general economic crisis such 
as that in China during the second half of the 1970s, the cost for the central government to tackle those social • 
problems alone would be too high. While the central government delegates certain power to the localities and ! 
individual enterprises, the costs of exercising this power and consequent burdens presumably go ajong with the 
delegation to the local governments and individual enterprises. My argument highlights the political rationale for 
the Center to decentralize. It is different from the complexity or necessity argument whereby the Center is treated 
as a "fair judge" without private, personal interests. 
Further, in the regulatory realm as a public policy concerning the allocation of resources, the distribution , 
' 
of regulatory benefits and burdens are considered a critical variable in determining which policy is to be chosen. 
Benefit concentration and cost diffusion that are produced by a public policy are considered as the hallmarks of such 
distributive politics as decentrali:ration. This cost diffusion reduces the amount of burden each unit might have to 
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cany and this benefit concentration makes palpable favor to selected beneficiaries for political support. The central 
government would therefore adopt reforms to effect these results. The decentralization reform is a perfect program 
i 
of this nature. Theoretically, decentralization reforms need not necessarily be pursued across the board. 
I 
' Practically, decentralization comes piece-meal. Pilot projects, gradual opening up of port cities, and ministry-
j 
contract system (bumen baogan) in the post-Mao China have provided a textbook-style illustration of this piece-meal 
' 
decentralization. 61 Contes~ts for power would promote policy formulas based on select\ve allo~tion which I 
enable central leaders to reap political support instead of policy formulas based on universal rules. Deeentralization I 
allows them to select beneficiaries and diffuse costs produced by some central policies. Central leadeL would also .
1
1 
prefer expansionary policies that enable them to give away policy benefits to as many bureaucratic groups as 
' ! 
possible, be they in central ministries or local governments. Introduction of the central cities (zhong~in chengshf) 
I 
and partial decentralization or dual-track system in post-Mao reforms were expansionary policies that would not : 
seriously impair the central capacity of regulating the economy. 
When the succession struggle was fierce, central elites needed to expand their power bases in order to gain 
more political support. So, as some scholars have pointed out, many Chinese leaders played to the provinces or , 
other local entities. 62 Zhao Ziyang was vigorously behind the decentralization initiative. His disgrace in 1989 set 
back the decentralization reform and especially hampered his political supporters in the following ~o years. But ' 
' ' 
the need for local political support in a much decentralized system forced the central leaders--including Deng 
Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun-to continue to "play to the localities. "" Central elites solicit local support 
by giving out some central power. Decentralization as a policy instrument is not used to seek decentralization as 
I 
an end product. Neither is decentralization reform lannched by the national elites an attempt at dissolution of the 
central government. Decentralization is, therefore, a process whereby the central power apparatus allows some 
organization and interplay of interests but tries to maintain intact its own capacity to intervene. 
I 
The analytic framework that I am setting up applies the economic reasoning of cost-benefit analysis to 
examine political programs. It points out that in a fragmented authoritarian regime, 64 different politick forces push 
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the reform in different directions, and political leaders are more than aware of this. They advocate decentralization 
based upon selective allocation that allows them to acquire political benefits and avoid political costs. This cost- , 
benefit calculation has not only laid the foundation for policy choices, but also constructed the refo~ into "piece-
meal" deals. A framework of choice generates more power in explaining policy strategies. 1 I 
I 
In studies of democratization, scholars find that decentralization is chosen if major political forces are 
secured by the institutions that would not affect their interests adversely under the new system. 65 ~s is true in I 
China. The Chinese advocates of decentralization reforms attempted to go as far as they could "(ithout losing I 
control over the reform initiative, pace, and macro economic projects. In post-Mao China, those assuring : 
' ' 
institutions have been reflected ultimately in Deng Xiaoping's "Four Basic Principles"--adherence to ~ocialism, the i 
I ; 
' 
dictatorship of the proletariat, rule by the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought--and practically in ' 
I 
the scheme of "Planned Market Economy"(or dual-track system). Chinese leaders in the Center have tried to retain 
control of reform until a new system is established. This new system should not hurt their own interests-political i 
office and economic privilege at individual level, and political stability and economic prosperity at national level. 
I 
Reformers in the post-Mao China have attempted at least three different kinds of decentralization programs 
in order to strengthen their political base, to weaken their opponents' power, or to reduce their political and 
economic risks. The first kind of decentralization is the delegation of decision-making authority from the Party 
I 
secretaries to administrators in the government and to the managers in the enterprises, or the so-called "separation 
of the Party and the Government administration" (dang zheng fenjia). Although there were setpacks .for the 
optimum decentralizers during the two years after 1989, dang zheng fenjia has resulted in a clear decline of the 
Party's administrative power and a clear increase of power of the State Council. The second is the delegation of 
decision making authority from some central point (e.g. the State Council and central commissions apd ministries); 
' to local government administrations and local departments, or the so-called "straightening-out of thp relationship 
I 
between the central and local governments" (lishun zhongyang yu difang guanxi). This is ~dministrative 
decentralization. The third is the delegation of decision making authority from the state all the !way down to 
I 
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individual enterprises, or the so-called "separation of the government administration and enterprise management" 
(zheng qi fenjia). This belongs to the category of liberalization or marketization. 
I I 
In facing the legacy of Maoism, there was an incentive for Chinese central leaders to implement the first 
I ' 
I I 
two delegations involving the Party, central and local governments so as to rally a political coalition for the power I 
' ' 
struggle, or to give away policy benefits to gain more support from below for further reforms. These first two ! 
, I 
. I 
delegations also shifted economic burden or responsibility away from the Center. Since individual enterprises did I 
' 
not emerge as a counterbalance in central power struggle, Chinese leaders were not attracted to any ~beralization I 
reforms. Moreover, because of stringent ideological constraints during the early 1980s, it was cost!~ and a great I 
risk for Chinese leaders to attempt to create a new constituency in the market. 
: I 
' Furthermore, the first, Party-to-administration delegation resulted from a political struggle that comprised ' 
' 
both factional and generational dimensions. While the radicals, i.e. "red" generalists, were holding power during 
the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping represented the opposition to them, i.e. "white" specialists. In other words, 
Deng Xiaoping and his followers and allies represented the professional faction against the "Gang of Four" radical 
faction. As far as generational conflict was concerned, Deng Xiaoping et al. represented revolutionary veterans : 
' 
against those Red Guard upstarts from the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping and the reformers first took over . 
! 
the power held by those promoted during the Cultural Revolution. This agenda attracted support from the Chen 
Yun group which advocated the minimum decentralization approach. The first, Party-to-administrati!Jn delegation 
' 
was also intended to curtail the frequent interference of political workers in economic matters. IThis kind of 
delegation enhanced the power of the central administration, which also influenced Chen Yun's endorsement. In 
other words, this decentralization program became a linkage point where Deng-Chen groups colluded to overthrow 
' 
Mao's initial successor. 
' 
Decentralization in the first decade of the post-Mao reform was quite limited, so that the cbntral leaders 
I 
could still hold back some of their traditional political and economic benefits. The reform involv"4 primarily an 
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administrative decentralization rather than a straightforward liberalization or marketization. Property rights were 
tightly controlled in the bands of the central government. Tue entire decentralization reform in the post-Mao era : 
' 
has produced two obvious results: more power was gained by local governments rather than individual enterprises, : 
' ' 
and more decentralization occurred in areas other than heavy industries or raw and semi-finished prJducts. Since : 
raw and semi-finished products were what constituted the bulk of supply to Chinese industry, the Cen~er, including i 
all leaders supporting different economic approaches, believed that it was natural that planning was m~re dominant I 
in industry as a whole and in supply than in production or marketing. The post-Mao power structure still favored j 
I 
heavy industrial interests in charge of large state-owned enterprises. 66 
I 
The central government maintained a quite ~ 
' ' 
high degree of 'planned adjustment' over the supply, production, and marketing of raw and semi-finished products; 
1 I 
' ' 
an adjustment which, even well understood by the Chinese reformist officials, 'has not only lll!'filtained the I 
; I 
consuming enterprises' dependence on the government and the tendency to hoarding, but has also ~eld back the i 
producing enterprises' responsiveness to the market. ' 61 ' I 
Tue Party-to-administration decentralization attracted both the Deng Xiaoping and the Chen Yun groups. 
Tue Dengist group's tolera,nce of the slow-pace decentralization in the heavy industries won the coalition of the Chen ' 
Yun group. Holding the power of allocation of strategically important heavy industrial goods was like hitting two · 
birds with one stone at one time. In China, the slow-pace of decentralization in the heavy industries created a 1 
. ' 
(temporary) balance, i.e. delegating powers to gain local supports from provincial governments !11\d enterprises 
without hurting t~o much the heavy industries represented by central ministries and conservative leaders, namely 
I 
some of Chen Yun's associates. Other reforms including department contracting and a variety of ~ponsibility 
I 
' systems (baoganzhi), like 'investment responsibility system," 'allocation responsibility system," "credit 
! 
responsibility system," and 'foreign trade responsibility system," also enhance the power of local governments and . , 
various central ministries at the same time. These responsibility systems, on one hand, made each government 
agency responsible for input resources for production and construction, and responsible for consequ~nces of their 
deeds; on the other hand, gave them the freedom to use and the authority to control investment, in~ut resources, 
credits, and foreign hard currencies. Local governments and central bureaucracies supported the dlentralization 
I 
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reform from different perspectives. Such decentralization design was intended to 'enliven the economy' without 
losing control over it. AP, decentralization reforms loosening more central power and creating more new interests , 
' even in bureaucracies, however, more people would support optimum decentralization reforms. In return the 1 
i I 
reformist leaders had their political position strengthened. 
Ideologically, such a decentralization design convinced the conservatives and reformers ~ike that the I 
national economy was still under their control. Since the heavy industry comprised the backbone of,the economy j 
I 
in terms of input resources and output values, the Chinese economy could be seen as mainly state-owned, the idea i 
' 
of which echoing the fundamental line of 'Planning playing the major role with the market a supplemental)' part.' 
CONCLUSION 
Echoing new scholarship in positive political economy, this paper assumes that central decisionmakers 1 
choose different policies in accord with their own interests through available institutional channels to deal with 
succession and economic problems. Decentralization does not come across the board. Political coal\tions form to 
support one or more public policies. Leaders and their supporters choose a particular decentralizatjon design in i 
' ' 
order to enhance their own power base, to nourish economic prosperity of their own constituency, and to impair , 
political rivals. 
In the succession struggle and in dealing with the economic crisis from the late 1970s till th~ early 1980s, 
Hua Guofeng's moderate leftist approach was rejected for it did not gain majority support from other central leaders, 
provincial officials and militaty officers. Because of their similar decentralization programs, Chen Yun and Deng 
Xiaoping joined in a reform coalition against Hua Guofeng. While the local power and non-state sectors were , 
growing as a result of these decentralization reforms, Deng Xiaoping's program, however, became more appealing · 
to a variety of interest groups in critical positions and to a larger population. 
I 
I 
From the choice theoretic perspective, I have identified different central leaders' preferences, traced the 
I 
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exogenous factors in the larger political and economic environment that frame their choices, and analyzed the 
I 
reasoning of the actual policy outputs that resulted from their choices as modified by the competing interests of other I 
relevant factors. I 
I 
In sum, the post-Mao central government launched a decentralization reform for the follo'Ying reasons. 
' 
First, those who were purged during the Cultural Revolution, i.e. the Deng Xiaoping group and ~e Chen Yun 
. I 
group, joined together to overthrow Mao's successor Hua Guofeng. Second, decentralization was beneficial to the 
I 
Center, enabling it to cast off many heavy burdens but still hold essential control. Third, this ref9rm was also I 
welcomed by the local governments and other local entities because it enhanced administrative 
1
freedom and ' 
I ' 
economic prosperity. Moreover, a decentralization reform initiated by the Center gave it the leveJge to launch / I , 
some benefit-concentrated and cost-diffused reforms in order to reach out for support from a varie~ of interests. 
Furthermore, this reform which decentralized managerial and administrative power but not owne~hip did not . 
fundamentally change the rules of the political game where the central elites dominates. Finally, this 
decentralization reform has been characterized by its piece-meal character. This piece-meal decentralization, best 
I 
' explained by the framework of choice, has benefited many central leaders and local interests, but has also prolonged i 
the reform process in China. 
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